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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

DI LEDSTORAGE SBSR-1635

Country: USSR .

Subject: Anatoliy Mikhaylovich GOLITSYN

DOI : 1966 - 1972

Source : A former Soviet military officer who defected to the West and

was later run as a KGB agent

Any dissemination of this information to Field Stations or to officers not on the initial distribution must be coordinated with SE/CI/X. As a general rule, [PDSTORAGE information is not releasable to foreign or domestic liaison services or to any office outside the DDO.

- 1. During the period 1966 to 1972 Source had a standing requirement from his KGB handlers to report anything he could learn about the defectors Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Golitsyn and Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, in addition to a general requirement to report on any Soviet defectors. At first the KGB gave Source to understand that the KGB's intention was to kill Golitsyn and Nosenko, if they could be located; in fact, the KGB specifically told Source that this was its intention toward Nosenko.
- 2. In 1968 Source's KGB handler said that the KGB had information indicating that both Golitsyn and Nosenko were somewhat unhappy and seemed to regret having defected. The handler added that, now that there were direct flights between the US and the USSR, Golitsyn or Nosenko might be "put in a box" and flown to the USSR. Source was again urged to try to find out the whereabouts of these defectors.
- 3. In 1972 Source's KGB handler indicated particular interest in the whereabouts of Golitsyn, saying that he might be more dissatisfied than Nosenko with conditions in the US. Source was told to continue efforts to establish contact with Golitsyn and to assess his recruitment potential. When Source said that he had previously been given to understand that the KGB wanted to kill

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Golitsyn, the KGB handler denied that this had ever been the KTB's intention, although he allowed that Source's previous handler might have said that on his own. Source had the impression that the KGB was convinced that, if Golitsyn were properly approached, he would work for the KGB mgain.

COVMENT:

The above information is being made available outside DDR to C/GS/Security Analysis Group in EYES ONLY memorandum form without reference to the PDSTORAGE cryptonym.

27 June 1975

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